With judgment no. 4087 of 4 November 2025, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation – Labour Section – confirmed the legitimacy of a dismissal for just cause imposed on an employee who had misappropriated company products, focusing in particular on the principle of promptness in disciplinary charges.
In the case examined, an employee working at a pharmacy had been dismissed for having taken, between December 2014 and February 2015, products intended for sale, resulting in a shortage of significant economic value. The employer proceeded to issue the disciplinary charge in March 2015, once the internal administrative and accounting checks necessary to reconstruct the extent and systematic nature of the conduct had been completed.
The employee challenged the dismissal, alleging a breach of the principle of promptness in the disciplinary charge. Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal, however, found the dismissal to be lawful, emphasizing the seriousness of the established conduct and its suitability to irreversibly undermine the relationship of trust. The courts of merits also ruled out any lateness in the disciplinary charge, considering the time elapsed to be justified by the complexity of the investigations carried out and by the seriousness of the conduct established.
The Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the employee’s appeal, reiterating that the principle of promptness in disciplinary charges is not absolute, but must be assessed in light of the circumstances of the specific case. In particular, the time required by the employer to acquire full and reliable knowledge of the facts may justify a postponement of the charge, without this, in itself, rendering the dismissal unlawful.
In conclusion, the ruling confirms that the misappropriation of company products constitutes a serious breach of the duties of fairness and loyalty and may justify dismissal for just cause, even where the disciplinary charge is brought some time after the conduct, provided that the delay is justified by the manner in which the facts were ascertained.
Summary
1. Regulatory framework of the employee’s right to criticize
Regulatory Framework
The employee’s right to criticize constitutes a specific expression of the freedom of thought guaranteed by Article 21 of the Italian Constitution, as an aspect of the individual’s moral personality that is exercised even within the employment relationship. This right also finds its foundation in Article 2 of the Constitution, which protects human dignity and the inviolable rights of the person in social relations. From a supranational perspective, it is further supported by Articles 10 of the ECHR (which reaffirms that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”) and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, both of which establish freedom of expression as an essential element of democratic citizenship.
However, in line with the relative and balanced nature of fundamental rights, the employee’s right to criticize is subject to limitations arising from the need to reconcile it with other constitutionally protected values. On the one hand, this includes the protection of a person’s honor, reputation, and dignity (Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution). On the other hand, it encompasses the freedom of private economic initiative (Article 41 of the Constitution), which cannot be undermined by forms of expression that damage the company’s image or operational efficiency.
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In judgment no. 28367 of 27 October 2025, the Court of Cassation – Labour Section – upheld the legitimacy of the summary dismissal imposed on an employee who, outside working hours, had engaged in sporting activities that were inconsistent with the medical prescriptions limiting his physical fitness for the performance of certain duties.
In the case at hand, a production-line worker had been declared fit for work with restrictions by the occupational physician, who had prohibited him from handling loads exceeding 18 kg and from lifting items above shoulder height due to a spinal condition. The employer, however, discovered that the employee routinely worked as a personal trainer at a gym in his free time, performing weightlifting exercises that were incompatible with the imposed restrictions. Evidence of such conduct also came from videos posted by the employee himself on his social media profiles.
Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of Rome upheld the legitimacy of the disciplinary dismissal, finding that the conduct in question was capable of undermining the relationship of trust and amounted to a breach of the employee’s duties of loyalty, fairness and good faith. The Court of Appeal, in particular, emphasised that the evidence of the facts did not derive from the investigative activities ordered by the employer, but from the employee’s own conduct during the proceedings—he had never disputed the factual circumstances alleged—and from the content he himself had shared online.
The Court of Cassation dismissed the employee’s appeal in its entirety, confirming the soundness of the reasoning adopted by the lower courts. First, it reiterated that the obligations of an employee do not end with the performance of work duties, but extend to ancillary duties of fairness and good faith, which complement and broaden the duty of loyalty owed to the employer. These obligations also apply to off-duty conduct when such conduct may potentially harm the employer’s interests or undermine the trust required for the continuation of the employment relationship.
Second, the Supreme Court clarified that, for just cause to be established, actual harm is not required; it is sufficient for the conduct to be potentially detrimental. In the case at hand, the employee’s systematic engagement in sporting activities that contravened medical prescriptions was deemed incompatible with the restrictions imposed to protect his health, exposing the employer to the risk of an aggravation of the condition and further sickness absences.
In conclusion, the ruling reaffirms that the employee’s duty of loyalty includes the obligation to maintain behaviour consistent with their physical condition and with the employer’s organisational needs, even outside working hours. Engaging in sporting activities that may be harmful to one’s health, in violation of medical prescriptions known to the employer, constitutes a serious breach of trust and may justify summary dismissal.
In its judgment no. 500/2025, the Court of Appeal of Bologna, on 13 October 2025, provides an important analysis of the principles governing challenges to multiple dismissals served on the same employee, with a specific focus on the distinction between “subsequent” and “simultaneous” dismissals and the resulting procedural implications. The Court, upholding the first-instance decision, rejected the employee’s appeal and reiterated that the failure to challenge one of the two dismissals in court makes that dismissal final, thereby eliminating any standing to sue (i.e. “interesse ad agire”) in relation to the other.
The case originated from two dismissals for just cause served on a branch manager. The employer had contested two separate disciplinary charges: the first concerning unauthorised absences, and the second concerning irregular use of the company fuel card. At the end of the two disciplinary proceedings, the employer issued two separate dismissal letters, one for each charge. Both letters were received by the employee at the same time.
The employee challenged both dismissals out of court with a single notice, but subsequently brought judicial proceedings only against the first dismissal, and not against the second.
The first-instance court dismissed the claim for “lack of concrete standing to sue”. The Tribunal reasoned that even if the challenged dismissal were found unlawful, the employment relationship would still be deemed terminated due to the second dismissal, which – having not been challenged in court – had become valid, effective, and capable of producing its effects.
The employee appealed the first-instance judgment, raising three grounds of appeal. The core of his defence lay in the first ground, in which he challenged the finding of lack of standing. The appellant argued that the two dismissals, although sent on the same day, had been issued at different times (3:15 p.m. and 3:17 p.m.), thus constituting so-called “successive dismissals”.
Relying on Italian Supreme Court case law (judgments no. 106/2013, no. 1244/2011, and no. 2274/2024), he argued that the second dismissal should be considered tamquam non esset, as it was based on facts already known to the employer at the time of the first dismissal. Therefore, the second dismissal was non-existent, and his interest in obtaining a ruling on the unlawfulness of the first dismissal should be recognised. In the remaining grounds of appeal, he reiterated his arguments on the merits, contesting the factual basis of the alleged unauthorised absences and seeking reinstatement.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, holding the first ground unfounded and the others absorbed. The decision rests on a careful analysis of the legal nature of dismissals and the moment at which they take effect.
The central issue in the judgment is the classification of the two dismissals as simultaneous, rather than subsequent.
The Court clarified that the case law on “successive dismissals”, invoked by the appellant, does not apply, as it concerns dismissals served at different and subsequent points in time. To establish simultaneity, the panel identified the legally relevant moment not in the date or time of dispatch of the letters, but in the moment of their receipt by the employee. As dismissals are unilateral receptive acts, their effectiveness depends on when they enter the employee’s sphere of knowledge.
The Court emphasised that: “…this conclusion follows from the fact that the two dismissals affecting the present appellant – although distinct – must be considered simultaneous, and the principles set out in the Supreme Court case law relied upon by the appellant […] cannot apply, as they concern cases of dismissals that are subsequent to one another (so-called ‘successive dismissals’).”
The Court also highlighted that the employee’s own out-of-court challenge, which referred to both dismissals with a single date (28 June 2023) and without distinguishing the time of receipt, further confirmed their simultaneous nature.
On this basis, the Court upheld the correctness of the first-instance judgment. Since the second dismissal (concerning the fuel card) was not challenged in court within the 180-day statutory limitation period, it became final and fully effective in terminating the employment relationship.
This rendered any ruling on the lawfulness of the first dismissal irrelevant. Even if the first dismissal were declared null or unlawful, the employment relationship would in any event be considered terminated by the second dismissal, which had become definitive due to the lack of judicial challenge. Accordingly, the employee no longer had any concrete and current interest in obtaining a judgment on the first dismissal, thus justifying the procedural dismissal of the claim.
With judgment no. 29341 of November 6, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court, Labor Division, confirmed the legitimacy of the disciplinary dismissal imposed on an employee who refused to report for work at her new place of assignment, reiterating that an employee’s refusal to perform their duties – even when the transfer is disputed. must comply with the principles of fairness and good faith set out in Article 1460, paragraph 2, of the Italian Civil Code.
In the case at hand, the employee, who had been transferred following the closure of her original workplace, was absent from work for several days, refusing to report to the new location and justifying her absence by claiming family difficulties and the alleged unlawfulness of the transfer. The company, deeming her conduct unjustified, imposed disciplinary dismissal.
The Court of Appeal of Rome, confirming the first-instance decision, considered the dismissal lawful. It found that the organizational needs underlying the transfer were documented and uncontested, as the employer no longer had any operational site in the employee’s previous city. The employee, although claiming that she was materially unable to relocate due to family issues, had never provided concrete details regarding such impediments.
The Italian Supreme Court, dismissing the employee’s appeal, reiterated that the unlawfulness of an employer’s decision does not automatically justify the employee’s refusal to perform their work duties, unless such refusal is necessary to avoid serious and immediate harm to the employee’s fundamental rights. Good faith must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the seriousness of the employer’s breach, the employee’s personal and family circumstances, and the impact of the refusal on the company’s organization.
In this case, the Court upheld the assessment of the lower courts. A refusal is justifiable only when there is serious and immediate prejudice to the worker’s fundamental rights, to be evaluated according to the principles of proportionality and good faith.
In the absence of such conditions, as in the present case,the employee’s conduct constitutes a disciplinary breach and justifies dismissal.
