Con l’ordinanza n. 26634 del 14 ottobre 2024, la Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Lavoro, ha affermato che il licenziamento per superamento del periodo di comportonon rientra nella previsione di nullità stabilita dall’art. 46, D.L. n. 18/2020 (c.d. “blocco” dei licenziamenti per emergenza pandemica da Covid-19) e ha, al contempo, precisato il corretto criterio di computo delle giornate di malattia per i lavoratori che operano in regime di part-time verticale.
Il caso esaminato dall’ordinanza in commento riguarda il licenziamento per superamento del periodo di comporto intimato, in data 25 novembre 2020, all’epoca della vigenza del “blocco” dei licenziamenti per emergenza Covid-19, ad una lavoratrice con contratto di lavoro subordinato a tempo parziale verticale al 50%, distribuito su tre giornate.
In particolare, il licenziamento veniva irrogato a fronte dell’assenza della lavoratrice dal posto di lavoro per malattia per 113 giorni nell’arco temporale tra il 6 agosto e il 25 novembre 2020, senza soluzione di continuità, come attestato dai sedici certificati medici emessi in sequenza a copertura dell’intero periodo.
Impugnato il licenziamento in sede giudiziale ritenendolo nullo in conseguenza del “blocco” imposto durante l’emergenza sanitaria, la lavoratrice risultava soccombente sia in primo che in secondo grado.
Specificamente, la Corte d’Appello di Roma – preliminarmente ritenuta, contrariamente al Tribunale, l’ammissibilità della domanda – rigettava il reclamo della lavoratrice affermando che, non potendosi applicare la previsione di nullità stabilita dall’art. 46, D.L. n. 18/2020 al licenziamento per superamento del periodo di comporto, avendo quest’ultimo natura diversa dal licenziamento per giustificato motivo oggettivo, e stante, comunque, il carattere speciale dell’art. 46, nel caso di specie il periodo di comporto era stato ampiamente superato, essendo la malattia proseguita per un periodo superiore al limite previsto dal CCNL applicato per la conservazione del posto di lavoro in caso di regime part-time di tipo verticale, pari alla metà delle giornate lavorative concordate tra le parti in un anno solare (78,5).
La lavoratrice proponeva quindi ricorso per Cassazione, censurando la decisione della Corte d’Appello per due motivi.
In primo luogo, per non avere la Corte territoriale esteso la nullità del divieto di licenziamento anche al recesso per superamento del periodo di comporto, in quanto riconducibile alla fattispecie del giustificato motivo oggettivo, per i riflessi delle assenze per malattia della lavoratrice sull’organizzazione aziendale.
In secondo luogo, per erronea individuazione del criterio di computo delle giornate di malattia in regime di part-time verticale, in violazione dei principi di proporzionalità e non discriminazione, per effetto di una riduzione della metà del numero delle giornate concordate, ma non anche del loro numero ai fini del computo delle giornate di malattia per il suo superamento.
La Corte di Cassazione ha respinto il ricorso della lavoratrice ritenendo entrambi i motivi di doglianza infondati.
In particolare, con riferimento al primo motivo, la Suprema Corte ha preliminarmente sottolineato come la natura di norma speciale dell’art. 46, D.L. n. 18/2020 (ispirato alla specifica ratio di tutela dei lavoratori dalle conseguenze negative sull’occupazione derivanti dal blocco o dalla riduzione dell’attività produttiva conseguente all’emergenza Covid-19) ne escluda l’applicabilità in via analogica.
Ad avviso della Corte, tale tesi sarebbe avvalorata anche dal fatto che, in altro recente giudizio di legittimità, la norma in esame è stata oggetto di ordinanza di rimessione alla Corte Costituzionale per contrasto con l’art. 3 Cost. Nello specifico, gli Ermellini hanno dubitato della ragionevolezza dell’art. 46 in considerazione del fatto che, pur non essendoci, ai fini del divieto, alcuna diversità tra licenziamento collettivo e licenziamento individuale, tale norma non include tra le fattispecie coperte dal “blocco” anche l’ipotesi di giustificatezza del licenziamento individuale dei dirigenti, ai quali tuttavia il divieto si applica in caso di licenziamento collettivo, creando, così, un ingiustificato difetto di simmetria sul piano della disciplina legale dei licenziamenti individuali e di quelli collettivi per i dirigenti. Se, dunque, l’applicazione analogica dell’art. 46 non è ammissibile all’interno del perimetro del licenziamento economico, a maggior ragione la nullità del divieto non può estendersi all’ipotesi di recesso per superamento del periodo di comporto che è soggetto alle regole dettate dall’art. 2110 c.c., prevalenti, per la loro specialità, sia sulla disciplina generale della risoluzione del contratto per impossibilità parziale della prestazione lavorativa, sia sulla disciplina limitativa dei licenziamenti individuali.
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The Court of Rome differs from the Capitoline Court of Appeal guidelines over the exclusion of the dismissal prohibition for managers during the Covid emergency.
Measures to combat Covid 19 – Decree Law no. 18/2020 and Decree Law no. 104/2020 – Dismissal prohibition for objective justified reason – Manager – Dismissal for position redundancy – Prohibition breach – Not applicable
The emergency legislation on prohibiting dismissal for objective justified reasons is exceptional and cannot be applied to similar cases not expressly mentioned by the regulation. This means that the dismissal prohibition cannot be applied to an individual manager’s dismissal.
Court of Rome 25 October 2022, no. 8722
A few months after the Rome Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the applicability of the dismissal prohibition to managers, the Capitoline Court, in its recent ruling no. 8722 published on 25 October 2022, came to an opposite conclusion.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In August 2020 – the period covered by the general dismissal prohibition for objective justified reasons under Decree Law 14/8/2020, no. 104 – an employer company dismissed a manager for objective financial reasons.
Considering that managers were included in the group of workers protected by the dismissal prohibition under the emergency regulations, and as part of the first phase of the Fornero Procedure, the Judge declared the dismissal null and void, ordered the manager immediate reinstatement, and the company to pay the remuneration due from the dismissal date until reinstatement.
The company appealed against this decision before the Court of First Instance.
LEGISLATION AND CASE-LAW
Art. 46 Decree Law 17 March 2020, no. 18 prohibited collective dismissal procedures and employers from “terminating the contract for objective justified reasons under Art. 3 of Law no. 604 of 15 July 1966” regardless of the number of employees.
The dismissal prohibition applicable to this case was extended and subjected to further conditions and exceptions, by Decree Law 14/8/2020, no. 104.
The provision stated that, to cope with the COVID-19 emergency, private employers who partly benefited from the wage subsidies or the exemption from the payment of social security contributions could not terminate employment contracts for objective justified reasons under Art. 3 of Law 15/7/1966, no. 604 of 15/7/1966, regardless of the number of employees. The ongoing procedures at the Local Labour Inspectorate referred to in Art. 7 of the same law, were suspended.
The prohibitions and suspensions listed above did not apply in the following cases:
a) redundancies due to the definitive cessation of the company business, resulting from the company liquidation without any business continuation;
b) collective bargaining agreement, stipulated by the trade unions that are comparatively more representative at the national level, as an incentive to terminate the relationship;
c) redundancies due to bankruptcy when there was no company provisional operation or business termination.
Since the introduction of the dismissal prohibition, two opposing approaches have alternated in legal theory and case law on the applicability of this emergency legislation to individual dismissals of managers.
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Contracting a viral infection at work is treated as an illness covered by INAIL and proof of the aetiological link can be provided in court by rebuttable presumptions
In its Order no. 29435 of 10 October 2022, the Supreme Court overturned the Palermo Court of Appeal’s ruling and provided a different interpretation of the evidentiary framework in the disputed case.
The case submitted to the Supreme Court originates from an appeal brought before the Court of Agrigento in first instance and the Court of Appeal of Palermo in second instance by a professional nurse employed by a nursing home, to obtain INAIL coverage which is an allowance in annuity or lump sum under Presidential Decree no. 1124/1965. This was based on an alleged hepatitis C infection contracted during work, assuming that this was due to plausible and prolonged exposure to the relevant pathogens.
The local Court confirmed the Court’s first instance ruling, and initially rejected the worker’s request. Based on the possible multi-factorial origin of the illness, the Court considered that the proof of the work-related cause and harmfulness of the working environment borne by the worker had not been achieved. The Court stated that the assessment should not involve “the causal link of the occupational accident’s pathological effects, but the precise identification of the fact giving rise to the illness.”
The Trial Court added that the claimant had no memory of specific events occurring during work, such as accidental needle punctures. This is because the routine medication and treatment of liver-diseased patients was not sufficient to give entitlement to the protections requested. This evidence cannot benefit the party who made such declarations, and it was nullified by findings made in another case concerning a previous infection with hepatitis B virus, and which required “strict proof of the infectious event during work.”
The Court added that the “report of an examination by the hospital medical committee” established during the proceedings for compensation under Law no. 210/1992, was not relevant because it “expressed an opinion (on the disease occupational origin and exposure to risk) without disclosing the factual elements on which it was based.”
In its order, the Supreme Court overturned the Palermo Court of Appeal’s ruling, and referred to a long-standing and never contradicted case law by which “in compulsory insurance against accidents at work, the action of microbial or viral factors which, by penetrating human organism, alter the anatomo-physiological balance, is treated as an accident. This effect, even if manifested later, must relate to the work performance, even in the absence of a specific injury underlying the infection” and “the proof can be provided in court by rebuttable presumptions” (Court of Cassation labour section ruling no. 7306/2000, Court of Cassation, labour section ruling no. 20941/2004; Court of Cassation, labour section ruling no. 6899/2004).
In this case, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was not always coherent and linear, and referred to the need for a “precise identification of the fact giving rise to the illness.” This strayed from the above case law, wrongly concluding that a “strict proof of the infectious event during work” should have been provided based on the previous Hepatitis B incident.
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On 17 March, the Council of Ministers approved a new Decree Law on “Urgent measures to counter the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic, following the end of the state of emergency.” The Decree Law was published in the Official Gazette on 24 March (Decree Law no. 24/2022).
The state of emergency ended on 31 March, and, according to the statements made by the President of the Council of Ministers, it became necessary to issue new provisions aimed at facilitating the return to an “ordinary” situation.
Among the measures provided for by Decree Law no. 24/2022 and effective from 1 April, there is:
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Until 30 April 2022, to prevent the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 infection, anyone working in the private sector (including employees over 50, without prejudice to the vaccination obligation and related sanctions) is required to possess and submit a Covid-19 green pass (recovery, vaccination or test to access workplaces). This provision applies to those who carry out any work or training, including those under the employer’s executive power or volunteers, including those under external contracts. Those exempt from vaccination based on the appropriate medical certificate issued according to the criteria defined in the Ministry of Health circular are excluded. Workers who declare they do not possess the above certification or do not have it when entering the workplace are unjustified absentees until they submit the certification. This must be done no later than 30 April 2022, without disciplinary consequences and keeping their position. No pay or other compensation or emolument shall be due for days of unjustified absence. After the fifth day of unjustified absence, the employer may stipulate an employment contract for replacement, but for up to ten working days, renewable until 30 April 2022. The worker is allowed to return immediately to the workplace as soon as they have the necessary certification, if the employer has not already entered into an employment contract to replace them. This is under art. 9-septies of Decree Law no. 52/2021, converted into Law, with amendments, by Law no. 87/2021 and its subsequent amendments and additions (see, most recently, Law Decree no. 1/2022 as amended by the annex to conversion law 18/2022 and Decree Law no. 24/2022).
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