The Supreme Court, by its decision no. 24473 of 12 October 2024, ruled that individual abstentions
from work could not be qualified as a strike. The decision came after the rejection of the appeal
filed by some employees against a disciplinary sanction imposed by a highway company following
two days of unjustified absence. The Court of Appeal had upheld the lawfulness of the sanction on
the grounds that the workers’ absence had not been supported by a trade union declaration, which
is a necessary condition for the abstention to be classified as a strike. In particular, the Court of
First Instance had pointed out that in the absence of a formal notification from a trade union
announcing the starting time of the strike and in the absence of collective deliberation, the
workers’ behaviour had to be considered as an individual decision.
The workers challenged the decision, arguing that the right to strike could be exercised without a
trade union declaration. However, the Supreme Court stated that although the right to strike is an
individual right, it is essential that it is collectively agreed in the event of a conflict situation
involving the protection of a collective interest. Consequently, the Supreme Court rejected the
appeal and declared the sanction lawlful.
In the absence of a provision on the minimum duration of the contractual probationary period, the employer is entitled to dismiss an executive for failing to pass the probationary period even after only a few weeks, despite the fact that the parties had agreed on a duration of six months. This principle was established by the labor judge of the Court of Arezzo in his ruling of 7 October 2024.
In the present case, an executive had been hired with an open-ended contract in order to manage a business area, with a probationary period of six months. However, after only seven weeks of work, the company dismissed him, claiming a lack of consistency between the manager’s professional qualities and the specific business needs.
The executive challenged the lawfulness of the dismissal, arguing that the short duration of the probationary period was not sufficient for a proper evaluation of his skills. He also pointed out that, considering the time that had passed, it was not possible to make a full analysis of his abilities and of his potential contribution to the company. On the other hand, the company justified its decision by referring to the disagreements it had had with the sales manager and the manager’s commercial approach, which was considered to be “not very effective”.
The judge found the company’s decision reasonable, stating that the time elapsed was sufficient to assess the manager’s professional qualities. Furthermore, the judge ruled that it was up to the executive to prove that the few weeks of work were not sufficient to consider the probationary period completed, stating that the burden of proving the inadequacy of the duration was on the employee.
The decision under review highlights how the short duration of the probationary period does not, by itself, constitute a valid ground for challenging the lawfulness of the dismissal. Indeed, the employee must provide concrete evidence in support of his position, and the mere duration of the probationary period is not sufficient to prove the groundlessness of the dismissal.
Other related insights:
Vittorio De Luca, interviewed by Giorgio Pogliotti from Il Sole 24 Ore, discussed the issue of dismissal in cases of inflated expense reimbursements.
Special attention was given to the actions and processes companies should adopt in order to effectively sanction or dismiss employees who might take advantage of expense reimbursements to unjustly supplement their salaries
Here is the full video of the interview: il Sole 24 Ore
The Court of Cassation, in its order no. 18296 of 4 July 2024, ruled that an employee who adopts stubborn attitudes with respect to the company’s business irreparably damages the trust relationship with the employer and may therefore be subject to dismissal.
The present case specifically involved an employee of an environmental services company, who worked as a driver in charge of transporting waste to treatment centers using large vehicles. The employee had refused to carry out his duties, returning to the company with the vehicle still loaded. This behaviour exposed the employer to potential administrative sanctions and environmental violations, as well as complaints from the municipality, the sole client.
The employee had refused to unload the waste, initially referring to reasons related to delays in unloading the waste and later health reasons.
Despite repeated requests from his superior to proceed with unloading or to wait for a change of driver, the worker returned to the company without having completed the job.
The worker argued that, based on the National Collective Bargaining Agreement for employees of environmental services and the company’s disciplinary Code, insubordination could only be punished with conservative sanctions, such as suspension, limiting dismissal for more serious cases, such as those involving “de facto behaviour”.
The Court of Appeal, reforming the first-instance judgment, determined that the worker’s actions were not simply insubordination but amounted to a serious breach of duty, further complicated by administrative and legal consequences for the company. Such behavior constituted “just cause” for dismissal.
The employee subsequently appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Cassation.
The Court of Cassation stated that in the context of disciplinary dismissal, the notion of insubordination cannot be limited to the refusal to comply with the directives of superiors but includes any behaviour that undermines the execution and proper fulfillment of those directives within the framework of the company’s organization (Cass. No. 13411/2020).
In this case, the Supreme Court considered the employee’s behaviour to be more serious than mere insubordination.
The Court concluded that the employee’s intentional refusal to comply, together with his decision not to wait for the driver change and to return to the company with the load of waste – thereby obstructing waste disposal operations and exposing the employer to possible administrative sanctions – constituted a serious breach of trust and contractual obligations, justifying dismissal for just cause.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected the employee’s appeal, considering the company’s dismissal to be lawful.
In its order no. 26440 dated October 10, 2024, the Court of Cassation, Labor Section, reaffirmed the legitimacy of the dismissal imposed on an employee who had addressed a client in a rude and vulgar manner, once again underscoring the boundaries of judicial review in determining “just cause” for termination.
The judicial proceedings originated from the disciplinary dismissal of an employee assigned to the butcher counter of a supermarket, who had been accused by the employer of addressing an elderly customer with aggressive and inappropriate language.
While the court of first instance upheld the employee’s challenge to the dismissal, the Court of Appeal of Cagliari reversed this decision, confirming the legitimacy of the dismissal order.
In this case, the appellate court considered the employee’s behavior a serious breach of his contractual obligations, particularly the duty to “use courteous manners with the public and maintain a conduct consistent with civic duties,” warranting disciplinary dismissal pursuant to Article 215 of the collective bargaining agreement for employees in the Tertiary, Distribution, and Services sector, which governed the employment relationship.
The Court specifically emphasized the seriousness of the employee’s conduct, noting that the counter attendant, on that occasion, not only failed to apologize to the elderly customer but also escalated the argument with increasingly heated tones, resulting in what was described as “an undignified and somewhat concerning scene.” In assessing the appropriateness of the dismissal, the Court of Appeal also took into account the employee’s prior disciplinary record from the preceding two years. Although these prior incidents were not specifically similar, they highlighted a pattern of repeated non-compliance with company rules, rendering the continuation of the employment relationship unsustainable.
In the ruling under discussion, the Court of Cassation, by rejecting the employee’s appeal against the Cagliari Court’s decision, seized the opportunity to consolidate its stance and reaffirm certain prevailing principles concerning termination for just cause under Article 2119 of the Civil Code.
In particular, the Court of Cassation observed that “just cause,” understood as conduct that precludes even temporary continuation of the employment relationship, falls within the scope of so-called general clauses—normative provisions of limited and general content that require judicial specification in interpretation, “through consideration of both external factors relating to general societal awareness and principles implicitly referenced by the provision itself.”
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