With judgment no. 4087 of 4 November 2025, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation – Labour Section – confirmed the legitimacy of a dismissal for just cause imposed on an employee who had misappropriated company products, focusing in particular on the principle of promptness in disciplinary charges.
In the case examined, an employee working at a pharmacy had been dismissed for having taken, between December 2014 and February 2015, products intended for sale, resulting in a shortage of significant economic value. The employer proceeded to issue the disciplinary charge in March 2015, once the internal administrative and accounting checks necessary to reconstruct the extent and systematic nature of the conduct had been completed.
The employee challenged the dismissal, alleging a breach of the principle of promptness in the disciplinary charge. Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal, however, found the dismissal to be lawful, emphasizing the seriousness of the established conduct and its suitability to irreversibly undermine the relationship of trust. The courts of merits also ruled out any lateness in the disciplinary charge, considering the time elapsed to be justified by the complexity of the investigations carried out and by the seriousness of the conduct established.
The Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the employee’s appeal, reiterating that the principle of promptness in disciplinary charges is not absolute, but must be assessed in light of the circumstances of the specific case. In particular, the time required by the employer to acquire full and reliable knowledge of the facts may justify a postponement of the charge, without this, in itself, rendering the dismissal unlawful.
In conclusion, the ruling confirms that the misappropriation of company products constitutes a serious breach of the duties of fairness and loyalty and may justify dismissal for just cause, even where the disciplinary charge is brought some time after the conduct, provided that the delay is justified by the manner in which the facts were ascertained.
Summary
1. Regulatory framework of the employee’s right to criticize
Regulatory Framework
The employee’s right to criticize constitutes a specific expression of the freedom of thought guaranteed by Article 21 of the Italian Constitution, as an aspect of the individual’s moral personality that is exercised even within the employment relationship. This right also finds its foundation in Article 2 of the Constitution, which protects human dignity and the inviolable rights of the person in social relations. From a supranational perspective, it is further supported by Articles 10 of the ECHR (which reaffirms that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”) and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, both of which establish freedom of expression as an essential element of democratic citizenship.
However, in line with the relative and balanced nature of fundamental rights, the employee’s right to criticize is subject to limitations arising from the need to reconcile it with other constitutionally protected values. On the one hand, this includes the protection of a person’s honor, reputation, and dignity (Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution). On the other hand, it encompasses the freedom of private economic initiative (Article 41 of the Constitution), which cannot be undermined by forms of expression that damage the company’s image or operational efficiency.
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“The images collected through audiovisual systems may be used for disciplinary purposes only if all the conditions laid down by Article 4 of the Italian Workers’ Statute are met and provided that neither the law nor collective bargaining agreements limit such use; where a collective agreement provides for a clause on inadmissibility, that restriction remains fully effective even after the 2015 reform of the relevant provisions.” This was held by the Italian Supreme Court in judgment no. 30822 of November 24, 2025, which addresses the relationship between video surveillance, disciplinary powers, and collective bargaining.
The case arose from the dismissal of an employee working as a croupier, who was accused by the employer of having appropriated cash during chip-changing operations. The evidence relied upon by the company consisted of video footage recorded by cameras installed above the gaming tables, authorised several years earlier by the Labour Inspectorate.
While the first-instance court upheld the validity of the employer’s termination decision, the Court of Appeal declared the footage inadmissible and the dismissal unlawful, relying on a clause contained in the administrative authorisation – expressly incorporated into the collective agreement – which provided that the footage could not be used to support disciplinary charges against croupiers.
Given that the administrative authorisation had been obtained before the 2015 reform, the company appealed, arguing that the Jobs Act, by amending Article 4(3) of the Workers’ Statute, introduced the rule that images may be used “for all purposes connected with the employment relationship”, including disciplinary purposes, provided that the employee has been informed and data protection rules are complied with. According to this interpretation, the restrictive clause in the authorisation – and mirrored in the collective agreement – should be considered superseded by the new wording of Article 4 of the Workers’ Statute.
The Italian Supreme Court rejected the employer’s interpretation, recalling that Article 4 of the Workers’ Statute distinguishes between two categories of tools: tools that are potentially suitable for remote monitoring of employees’ activity, which require a trade union agreement or an authorisation from the Labour Inspectorate; and work tools, for which no such prior procedure is necessary. In the case at hand, the Court confirmed that the cameras could be regarded as “work tools”: their use was reserved exclusively to the control room and did not serve croupiers in performing their duties. On this basis, the Court found that Article 4 (1) and all related constraints were fully applicable.
With regard to the use of images for disciplinary purposes, the Court acknowledged that, following the 2015 reform, Article 4 (3) expressly allows such use, thereby overcoming the traditional distinction between defensive monitoring and monitoring of work performance. However, the Court emphasised that this rule applies only where no other sources – such as collective agreements – restrict the use of such data.
In earlier decisions, the Italian Supreme Court had already clarified that restrictive clauses contained in pre-reform administrative authorisations would not survive where incompatible with the new statutory framework.
In this case, however, the restriction was not confined to the authorisation: it had been expressly incorporated by the social partners into the collective agreement, through a specific clause reproducing the prohibition on using images for disciplinary purposes, even in the presence of conduct detrimental to the company’s assets.
“In this perspective, the inadmissibility of the information gathered through video cameras represents an expression of the free exercise of collective autonomy, which is undoubtedly worthy of protection, and in this case operates as a more favourable clause for the employee”.
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With judgment no. 43873 of November 24, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court – Labor Division – confirmed the legitimacy of a dismissal for just cause imposed on an employee on the basis of GPS data collected from the company car, reiterating that such monitoring activities are admissible when they are aimed at verifying unlawful conduct.
In the case at hand, the employee was working as a security guard using a company car equipped with a satellite tracking system. Following reports from clients regarding service disruptions, the employer initiated checks to reconstruct how the service had been performed during working hours.
The analysis of the vehicle’s GPS data showed that, on three separate occasions and during his assigned shift, the employee had parked the vehicle and remained inside it, whereas the service report he had drafted stated that he had visited different locations during the same time periods. This discrepancy between the employee’s statements and the GPS data led the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings, considering the conduct inconsistent with the required operating procedures. Moreover, the conduct was not an isolated incident but formed part of a repeated pattern of behaviour, previously sanctioned with conservative disciplinary measures. Based on these findings, the employer terminated the employment relationship for just cause.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, classifying the monitoring activities as defensive controls (i.e. checks aimed at detecting potentially unlawful conduct), thus excluding the applicability of Article 4 of Law no. 300/1970 (i.e. the Workers’ Statute), as the monitoring was aimed at verifying conduct potentially harmful to the organisation.
The Italian Supreme Court dismissed the employee’s appeal and confirmed this approach, reiterating that employers may legitimately use technological tools, such as GPS systems installed on company vehicles, when the monitoring is targeted, proportionate, and justified by the need to verify conduct that goes beyond the mere supervision of work performance.
The Court further clarified that determining whether such monitoring is aimed at detecting unlawful conduct, rather than surveilling work performance, is a factual assessment reserved to the lower courts and not subject to review on appeal, provided the reasoning is coherent. In this case, the appellate court found that the employee’s conduct was incompatible with the duties of fairness and loyalty and significantly damaged the relationship of trust.
In conclusion, this ruling confirms that GPS data collected from a company vehicle may legitimately ground a dismissal for just cause when the monitoring pursues defensive purposes and is aimed at determining conduct inconsistent with contractual obligations, without resulting in generalised surveillance of work performance.
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In judgment no. 28367 of 27 October 2025, the Court of Cassation – Labour Section – upheld the legitimacy of the summary dismissal imposed on an employee who, outside working hours, had engaged in sporting activities that were inconsistent with the medical prescriptions limiting his physical fitness for the performance of certain duties.
In the case at hand, a production-line worker had been declared fit for work with restrictions by the occupational physician, who had prohibited him from handling loads exceeding 18 kg and from lifting items above shoulder height due to a spinal condition. The employer, however, discovered that the employee routinely worked as a personal trainer at a gym in his free time, performing weightlifting exercises that were incompatible with the imposed restrictions. Evidence of such conduct also came from videos posted by the employee himself on his social media profiles.
Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of Rome upheld the legitimacy of the disciplinary dismissal, finding that the conduct in question was capable of undermining the relationship of trust and amounted to a breach of the employee’s duties of loyalty, fairness and good faith. The Court of Appeal, in particular, emphasised that the evidence of the facts did not derive from the investigative activities ordered by the employer, but from the employee’s own conduct during the proceedings—he had never disputed the factual circumstances alleged—and from the content he himself had shared online.
The Court of Cassation dismissed the employee’s appeal in its entirety, confirming the soundness of the reasoning adopted by the lower courts. First, it reiterated that the obligations of an employee do not end with the performance of work duties, but extend to ancillary duties of fairness and good faith, which complement and broaden the duty of loyalty owed to the employer. These obligations also apply to off-duty conduct when such conduct may potentially harm the employer’s interests or undermine the trust required for the continuation of the employment relationship.
Second, the Supreme Court clarified that, for just cause to be established, actual harm is not required; it is sufficient for the conduct to be potentially detrimental. In the case at hand, the employee’s systematic engagement in sporting activities that contravened medical prescriptions was deemed incompatible with the restrictions imposed to protect his health, exposing the employer to the risk of an aggravation of the condition and further sickness absences.
In conclusion, the ruling reaffirms that the employee’s duty of loyalty includes the obligation to maintain behaviour consistent with their physical condition and with the employer’s organisational needs, even outside working hours. Engaging in sporting activities that may be harmful to one’s health, in violation of medical prescriptions known to the employer, constitutes a serious breach of trust and may justify summary dismissal.
