Reflections in light of current events on workplace relationships
At a time when companies promote workplace well-being, diversity, and work-life balance, one issue often remains in the background—rarely spoken about, yet strongly felt: romantic relationships in the workplace.
This is anything but an easy matter to address, as it touches on sensitive aspects of employment law: the personal freedom of each individual clashing with the risk of conflicts of interest, while also involving the management of workplace climate and the employer’s responsibilities. A complex web, difficult to untangle—especially from a strictly legal standpoint.
Recent events have also brought the topic of workplace relationships to the forefront of public debate. Consider, for example, the so-called “ColdplayGate” case, where the kiss cam spotlight made viral the relationship (and alleged infidelity) of the then-CEO of Astronomer and the company’s HR manager. Or, more recently, the case of the now former CEO of Nestlé, who was dismissed by the company’s management for engaging in an “undisclosed relationship” with an employee, in breach of the corporate code of conduct and the group’s internal guidelines.
In any case, the point is clear: employment law and case law do not sanction personal feelings; rather, they aim to safeguard corporate organization, the principle of non-discrimination (between employees treated differently for relational reasons), and managerial transparency.
Indeed, a dismissal based solely on the mere existence of a romantic relationship between colleagues, or on its non-disclosure, would in all likelihood be deemed unlawful as a violation of the employee’s right to privacy.
However, dismissal may be considered legitimate if the employer can demonstrate that such a relationship has concretely and objectively created a conflict of interest or resulted in a breach of the duties of loyalty, fairness, and diligence, thereby irreparably undermining the bond of trust. The burden of proof for such circumstances, in any case, rests entirely with the employer.
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Checks must always be carried out in full compliance with the employee’s privacy and dignity.
The use of private investigation agencies can be a potentially very effective tool for companies, allowing them to identify unlawful conduct by their employees, such as the improper use of leave under Law 104/92. However, it is essential to strike a balance between the employer’s need to protect corporate interests and, on the other hand, the employee’s right to dignity and privacy. When resorting to this type of solution, any form of invasive or indiscriminate surveillance must be avoided.”
Furthermore, case law has reiterated that the use of private investigation agencies must be justified by concrete reasons. In fact, an investigation is deemed legitimate only when the employer has well-founded suspicions of an improper use of leave by the employee.
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In its Order No. 16358 of June 17, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court addressed the topic of dismissal for just cause, clarifying the distribution of the burden of proof and the appropriate approach that courts must adopt when the dismissal is based on multiple charges.
The case involved a disciplinary dismissal imposed by a symphony foundation (the “Foundation”) on a lyric singer during her sick leave. The employee was subject to two charges: first, leaving her residence during hours of medical availability, and second, engaging in various activities (such as dining out with her partner, shopping, and singing at religious events) despite her certified illness.
The Naples Tribunal rejected the employee’s appeal at both summary and full opposition stages (under the “Fornero Procedure”), upholding the legitimacy of the dismissal. The Naples Court of Appeal reversed the decision, ruling the dismissal unlawful and ordering the employee’s reinstatement along with eight months’ wage compensation.
The appellate court focused primarily on one of the charges, considering the singing activity during sick leave to be minor, occasional, and not amounting to professional work. Based on that, the court held that the alleged misconduct was unfounded.
The Foundation filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, arguing that the appellate court failed to assess the second, independent charge.
The Supreme Court upheld the Foundation’s claim on this point, overturning the ruling and remanding the case to a different panel of the Naples Court of Appeal for a new judgment.
The Court criticized the lower court for basing its decision solely on one charge. It reiterated the principle that, in cases of dismissal for just cause based on multiple allegations, each allegation may independently justify the sanction unless it is proven that only the cumulative effect of all the charges would warrant termination.
According to this principle, the employer need not prove that the dismissal depends on the totality of conduct, whereas the burden shifts to the employee to show that none of the charges, taken individually, would be serious enough to justify termination. The appellate court failed to consider this and omitted evaluation of one of the charges, thereby violating this principle.
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In Provision No. 288 of May 21, 2025, the Italian Data Protection Authority fined an Italian company €420,000 for unlawful processing of an employee’s personal data later used to justify her dismissal.
The employee filed a complaint against the company, alleging improper use of her personal data extracted from her “Facebook” profile, the “Messenger” app, and certain chats from the “WhatsApp” platform. These data, made known to the company, were used to support two separate disciplinary notices.
In the first notice, dated February 16, 2024, the company quoted the contents of some comments made by the complainant on her Facebook profile, including quoted excerpts and descriptions of certain photos. In the second notice, dated March 21, 2024, it referred to a conversation on Messenger between the complainant and a third party (not employed by the company) who forwarded the conversation to the company via WhatsApp, including quoted excerpts. This second notice also included excerpts from a WhatsApp message the complainant sent to some colleagues on February 22, 2024.
Referring to Article 8 of Law No. 300/1970 (the Italian Workers’ Statute), which prohibits the employer from carrying out investigations – including via third parties – into an employee’s political, religious, or trade union opinions, as well as facts irrelevant to assessing the employee’s professional aptitude, the company claimed it had played no active role in collecting the data. It argued that the information had been reported to it and could therefore be used for disciplinary purposes, as this would not constitute a prohibited investigation under the Workers’ Statute.
The Italian Data Protection Authority used the occasion to recall that:
– The legal system protects the freedom and confidentiality of communications, recognized as fundamental rights, and any limitation is allowed only “by reasoned decision of the judicial authority, in accordance with the law” (Article 15 of the Constitution). This presumption of confidentiality, as clarified by the Constitutional Court, extends to all communication tools made available by technological evolution. (Lawfulness principle)
– The mere publication of data on publicly accessible platforms, such as social networks, does not imply that the data subject has given general consent for the free use of that data for any purpose. A specific legal basis is required for any processing other than the original purpose. (Purpose limitation principle)
– The need for data processing based on legitimate interest – the justification cited by the company in its defense – must also be evaluated under the principle of minimization. The data controller must verify that “the legitimate interest pursued cannot reasonably be achieved through less harmful means for the fundamental rights of data subjects, particularly their right to privacy”. In this case, the company failed to demonstrate that it had assessed the impact of the processing on the employee’s rights or considered less intrusive alternatives, even though the disciplinary measures could have been based on other elements. (Data minimization principle)
The Authority clarified that while it is not tasked with evaluating the disciplinary facts themselves, it is the employer – as the data controller – who must assess not only the lawfulness but also the adequacy, relevance, and proportionality of the data processing to be carried out. The Authority found numerous violations by the company, which, “once it became aware that the transmitted data concerned private communications and comments on a closed Facebook profile, […] should have refrained from using them.”
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Analysis and Implications of Constitutional Court Ruling No. 111/2025, Which Also Introduces a New Factual Variable in Dismissal Litigation: the Employee’s Psycho-Physical Health Status
With ruling No. 111/2025, filed on 18 July 2025, the Constitutional Court delivered a significant decision in labor law, declaring the partial constitutional illegitimacy of Article 6, first paragraph, of Law No. 604 of 15 July 1966. The Court found unconstitutional the provision to the extent that it does not allow a worker who is in a state of incapacity of mind at the time of receiving the dismissal notice—or during the 60-day period for extrajudicial challenge—to be exempted from the obligation of prior extrajudicial contestation and to instead challenge the dismissal directly through judicial proceedings (or by requesting conciliation or arbitration) within 240 days from the communication of the dismissal.
To understand the scope of the Constitutional Court’s ruling, it is necessary to outline the regulatory and jurisprudential context in which it is situated.
The core of the legislation is found in Article 6 of Law No. 604 of 15 July 1966. In its current form—shaped by amendments first introduced by Article 32 of Law No. 183/2010 and later by Article 1, paragraph 38, of Law No. 92/2012—the provision structures dismissal challenges as a progressive process, marked by two temporal thresholds:
First Term (Extrajudicial Challenge): The employee must contest the dismissal “under penalty of forfeiture within sixty days of receiving written notice”. The challenge may be made “through any written act, including extrajudicial, suitable to make the employee’s intention known”.
Second Term (Judicial Action): The extrajudicial challenge is considered “ineffective if not followed, within the subsequent one hundred and eighty days, by filing a claim with the labor court registry or by notifying the other party of a request for conciliation or arbitration”.
Failure to comply with even a single one of these deadlines results in the forfeiture of the right to challenge the dismissal and, consequently, in the stabilization of its effects, preventing the employee from seeking either reinstatement or the merely compensatory remedies provided by the special legislation.
The classification of the term as a “forfeiture period” is of crucial importance. Pursuant to Article 2964 of the Italian Civil Code, forfeiture is neither subject to interruption nor suspension, unless otherwise provided. This general principle renders the dismissal challenge period impervious to personal circumstances that would normally suspend the running of time, such as illness. The rationale behind this rule is to require the exercise of a right within a predetermined and brief timeframe, thereby crystallizing an otherwise uncertain legal situation.
The 60-day period (dies a quo) begins from the “receipt” of the dismissal notice. Since dismissal is a unilateral communicative act, its effectiveness and the commencement of the related deadlines are governed by Article 1335 of the Civil Code, which establishes a presumption of knowledge:
“A proposal, acceptance, revocation, or any other declaration addressed to a specific person is deemed known at the moment it reaches the recipient’s address, unless the recipient proves that, without fault, they were unable to have knowledge of it.”
It is precisely the interpretation of this provision that underpins the established jurisprudential orientation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s rulings, dating back to early decisions such as Cass. no. 5563 of 1982, have interpreted these rules in a rigorous and formalistic manner, prioritizing legal certainty.
The dominant approach follows the so-called “theory of receipt” or “theory of knowability”. Under this interpretation, what matters for the effectiveness of the act is not the actual knowledge of the recipient, but its mere knowability, which is presumed at the moment the act reaches the recipient’s address.
As a direct consequence, the rebuttal allowed under Article 1335 c.c. (“impossibility of knowledge without fault”) cannot relate to the recipient’s subjective conditions.
As highlighted by the United Sections in the ordinance referring the matter to the Constitutional Court:
“The evidence suitable to overcome the presumption must therefore concern circumstances not related to the recipient’s subjective conditions but to external and objective factors, concerning the connection between the individual and the place of delivery, sufficient to exclude the knowability of the act” (Cass., United Sections, ordinance of 5 September 2024, registered as no. 202/2024).
Therefore, the employee’s incapacity to understand and act (natural incapacity) – being purely subjective and internal – has consistently been considered irrelevant for the running of the forfeiture period. The period starts inexorably from the moment the dismissal letter is delivered, regardless of whether the employee is able to comprehend its content or respond.
The United Sections further excluded the possibility of protecting the incapacitated employee under Article 428 c.c., which governs the annulment of acts carried out by persons lacking capacity. The rationale is that Article 428 c.c. applies to commissive acts (e.g., signing a contract). The failure to challenge a dismissal, instead, is an omissive conduct, a “failure to act” in defense of one’s rights, to which the rule cannot extend.
Jurisprudence has always justified this strict interpretation by balancing the interests at stake. On one side, there is the employee’s right to job stability; on the other, the employer’s interest in continuity and stability of business management. Imposing a short forfeiture period serves this latter interest, preventing organizational decisions from remaining in uncertainty for an extended period. Forfeiture, in this perspective, is not a sanction for inaction, but the objective consequence of failing to meet a procedural obligation designed to protect economic relationships.
In summary, the legal and jurisprudential framework can be described as “rigid”, built on three pillars:
It is precisely against the rigidity of this consolidated system that the ordinance of the United Sections of the Supreme Court is directed. While acknowledging its internal coherence and purpose of certainty, the referring Court questioned its compatibility with fundamental constitutional principles (reasonableness, equality, right to work, right to defense, and right to health) when applied to extreme situations of absolute and blameless incapacity, where the balance of interests is manifestly disproportionate against the employee.
The constitutional question raised by the United Sections of the Supreme Court
The Constitutional Court’s ruling stems from a question raised by the United Sections of the Supreme Court in a case involving an employee dismissed while suffering from a severe illness, leaving her naturally incapable at the time of receipt of the dismissal and during the 60-day extrajudicial challenge period.
The referring judge highlighted that the rigid application of the forfeiture period, insensitive to the employee’s subjective condition, could violate multiple constitutional provisions, including:
The Supreme Court therefore requested the Constitutional Court to issue an additive ruling, making the forfeiture period run not from the receipt of the dismissal, but from the moment the employee regains capacity to understand and act.
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