With Judgment No. 25167 of July 9, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court – Third Criminal Division – reiterated that, in order to establish the criminal offense of fraudulent tax return through the use of invoices for non-existent transactions (Article 2, Legislative Decree No. 74/2000), it is necessary to verify not only the awareness of the falsity of the transaction (i.e. general intent), but also the specific purpose of evading taxes.
In the case at hand, the director of a company had been convicted for having included in the tax return invoices related to a service contract deemed only formally such but actually used to conceal an illicit labor supply (i.e. “somministrazione illecita di manodopera”).
However, the Supreme Court found that the challenged ruling lacked any reasoning regarding the mental element of the offense, merely asserting the circumvention of contribution and contractual obligations, without any investigation into the taxpayer’s evasive intent.
Recalling a well-established legal principle (see Supreme Court Judgment No. 37131/2024), the Court emphasized that verifying the specific intent is essential, as it constitutes the qualifying subjective element of the offense. The mere use of invoices related to a fictitious contract – which masks a different economic operation – is not sufficient, in the absence of proof that the taxpayer knowingly pursued an undue tax saving.
In conclusion, the annulment with referral to the Court of Appeal of Perugia confirms the need, in tax criminal matters, for a rigorous assessment of fraudulent intent, which cannot be automatically inferred from the civil reclassification of the contractual relationship.
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On 21 July 2025, judgment no. 118/2025 was filed, in which the Constitutional Court declared the partial constitutional illegitimacy of Article 9, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 23/2015 (the so-called “Jobs Act”).
The ruling introduces significant changes in the protection against unlawful dismissal for employees of employers who do not meet the employment requirements set out in Article 18, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Workers’ Statute (so-called “sub-threshold employers”).
The contested provision (Article 9, paragraph 1, Legislative Decree 23/2015) provided for employees unlawfully dismissed by sub-threshold employers exclusively monetary protection, establishing that the amount of compensation provided for the various cases of unlawful dismissal (Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the same legislative decree) was to be halved compared to the compensation guaranteed to employees of companies with more than 15 employees and, in any case, could not exceed the limit of six months’ salary.
The Court held that the maximum limit of six months’ salary did not allow for “personalisation of the damage suffered by the worker” and did not constitute an effective deterrent against unlawful dismissals, violating the principles of reasonableness, equality and protection of employment (Articles 3, 4, 35, 41 and 117 of the Constitution).
Consequently, with the ruling in question, the Council declared the constitutional illegitimacy of this provision limited to the words ‘and may not in any case exceed the limit of six months’ salary.’ As a result, while the mechanism of halving the amounts remains in force, the maximum limit of six months’ salary no longer applies.
The Court’s intervention significantly expands the discretion of the judge, who may now award – in favour of employees hired after 7 March 2015 by employers below the threshold – compensation exceeding six months’ salary and up to a maximum of 18 months’ salary, commensurate with the specific circumstances of the case. The judge must take into account not only length of service but also other criteria such as the size of the employer’s economic activity (which, as emphasised by the Court, is not limited to the number of employees), the behaviour and conditions of the parties, thus ensuring that compensation is “personalised”.
The decision is consistent with the previous ruling no. 183/2022, in which the Court, although it had declared the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 9, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree 23/2015 inadmissible at the time, had nevertheless already identified a flaw in the relevant legislation and called for legislative action. In view of the inaction of the legislator, the Court decided that it could not wait any longer and took direct action to remove the most critical aspect of unconstitutionality.
As hoped for by the Court itself, future intervention by the legislator remains necessary in order to comprehensively review the criteria for identifying small businesses, supplementing the number of employees with indicators that are more representative of the employer’s real economic strength, such as turnover or total balance sheet.
With Ordinance No. 15987 of 2025, the Italian Court of Cassation established that a dismissal notice is presumed to be known by the recipient at the moment it is delivered to their residential address, even if the employee is not actually informed.
The case at hand concerns a dismissal imposed due to absolute and permanent unfitness for work, communicated to the employee by registered letter sent to their residential address. Specifically, the dismissal letter, properly delivered, was collected by the employee’s mother, who lived with him, and who decided not to hand it over to her son in order to protect him from potential psychological repercussions that the news of the dismissal might cause. Consequently, the employee challenged the dismissal after the statutory deadline of 60 days from receipt of the communication, invoking as justification for the late challenge the lack of knowledge of the dismissal.
However, both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of Bologna (second-instance judgment) declared the appeal inadmissible, due to the expiration of the challenge period, considering the communication received at the employee’s address to be fully valid. They relied on a legal presumption of knowledge, based on the substantial legal equivalence between “knowledge” and “knowability” in relation to the delivery of an act to the recipient’s domicile.
The Court of Cassation subsequently confirmed this interpretation, reaffirming that, under Italian law, there is a legal presumption of knowledge of acts: an act is deemed to be known when it reaches the recipient’s address. This presumption can only be rebutted in the presence of objective obstacles beyond the employee’s control, such as natural disasters, serious postal disruptions, or prolonged absences due to force majeure, but not by subjective factors attributable to the recipient.
In conclusion, the ruling reiterates that, under Italian law, the deadlines to contest a dismissal are strict and start from the moment the communication reaches the employee’s address, even in cases where subjective factors prevent the employee from becoming aware of the disciplinary measure imposed on them.
“The employer may collect employees’ Internet browsing logs and email metadata only under specific conditions and safeguards. This was affirmed by the Italian Data Protection Authority (i.e. “Garante Privacy”) when imposing a €50,000 fine on the Lombardy Region” (Provision No. 243 of April 29, 2025).
As stated on the Authority’s official website, this ruling follows an inspection aimed at verifying the Region’s compliance with privacy regulations concerning the processing of employee data. The measure comes almost a year after the publication of the guidance document titled “Programs and IT services for managing e-mail in the workplace and the processing of metadata” (Provision No. 364 of June 6, 2024).
Although this case specifically involved public administration, it is worth clarifying that all findings, observations, and clarifications issued by the Authority fully apply to private-sector data controllers as well.
“Metadata” refers to information related to the sending, receiving, and routing of messages. This may include the sender’s and recipient’s email addresses, IP addresses of the servers or clients involved in message routing, timestamps of sending, retransmission or receipt, message size, presence and size of any attachments, and, in certain cases depending on the email management system used, even the subject of the sent or received message.
Browsing logs, on the other hand, allow tracking of activities during web navigation and contain data such as visited IP addresses, URLs of opened web pages, connection times and durations, type of device and browser used, as well as any downloads or uploads performed.
The June 6, 2024, guidance clarifies that the maximum retention period for such data is 21 days. Any retention beyond this period is permissible only under specific conditions that justify the extension, and, in any case, one of the safeguards provided by Italian law under Article 4 of Law No. 300/1970 (the Workers’ Statute) must be satisfied: (i) an agreement with trade unions or, failing that, (ii) authorization from the local Labour Inspectorate.
This is because all such information allows the employer to identify behavioral patterns, understand workers’ relationships and habits, and infer elements such as performance and productivity. In other words, it may amount to indirect remote monitoring of employees’ activities.
During the Authority’s inspection, it emerged that the Region retained:
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By Judgment No. 315 of June 5, 2025, the Court of First Instance of Vicenza ruled that, for the purposes of territorial jurisdiction, the residence of a remote worker can only be considered relevant if it is demonstrated that a substantial and organized part of the work is carried out there on a stable basis, thereby anchoring the performance of the work to that location.
The employee, working as an external sales representative, contested his dismissal by bringing the case before the court in the district of his residence – where he also used the company – provided laptop and mobile phone.
The employer responded by raising a preliminary objection, challenging the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of first instance of Vicenza first referred to Article 413, paragraph 2 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, which, as is well-known, links territorial jurisdiction to three alternative criteria: namely, the district where (i) the employment relationship arose, (ii) the company or (iii) one of its branches to which the employee was assigned or where the employee performed work at the end of the employment relationship is located.
Following the Supreme Court’s previous rulings, the Court of first instance of Vicenza emphasized the need to interpret the concept of company branch broadly, in order to “make the proceedings more efficient and swift, anchoring them in locations normally closer to the employee’s residence, where the evidence necessary for the case can be more easily found” (Supreme Court judgments No. 506/2019 and No. 6458/2018).
That said, the Court of First Instance clarified that, in any case, “there must always be an objective or subjective connection between the place where the employee performs their work and the company’s organization.”
It should be considered that when remote work can be performed interchangeably from any location, without “any other element (or objective or subjective connection, as previously highlighted) emerging that would in any way characterize the employee’s residence as a company branch, in the sense described, then this criterion cannot be taken into account for determining territorial jurisdiction, leaving only the criteria of the place where the contract was concluded (…) or the office to which the employee was assigned (…).”
On this basis, the Court of First Instance of Vicenza – finding no evidence that a stable and organized portion of the employee’s fundamental work performance was carried out at his residence, so as to firmly anchor the activity to that place – upheld the employer’s objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
